THE GERMAN OCCUPATION
The German army arrives in Kyiv, 1918
According to Mędrzecki (pp.49-50), the Germans had already decided in principle 'to give military help to the UNR' on 5th February, prior to the signing of the Peace Treaty. A final decision was made on 13th February, quite independently of the Ukrainians, though Hrushevsky rushed through a formal request prior to the formal issuing of marching orders, which reached the German forces on 17-19th February. Pipes (p.130) says: 'The Soviet forces were incapable of offering even token resistance. As soon as news of the occupation had reached Kiev, all government and party organisations began feverishly to evacuate eastward. During the twenty days the Soviet Ukrainian government had been in control of Kiev it had not had the time to establish its authority over the country. The Germans entered the city on February 18/March 3, 1918, one week after the panic-stricken Communists had departed for Poltava.' This gave Petliura the opportunity to enter Kiev ahead of the Germans with his own forces and organise a 'victory parade' including a display of Red Army prisoners, much to the displeasure of the Germans and of the Rada itself when they arrived the next day. As a result Petliura was again deprived of all his military functions.
Pipes goes on to say that the Bolsheviks in Kharkov, who had always been unhappy about the Kievan adventure were not unduly saddened by these events:
'"economically our basin is connected with the Petrograd Republic," mused one of their press editorials on March 6, 1918, shortly after the Germans entered the city of Kiev, "politically it is also more convenient for us to join the Russian Federation. The conditions of national life in the provinces of Kharkov and Ekaterinoslav [modern Zaporozhia and Donbass - PB] also do not tie us to the Ukraine. The proletariat of the Donets Republic must focus all its efforts in the direction of asserting its autonomy and independence from the Ukraine.'
But the Germans did not stop their advance with Kiev. By the end of April they held 'the entire Ukrainian territory, Crimea and the territories adjacent to the Northern Caucasus' (9) ie the Donbass. Some areas of South-Western Ukraine were taken by the Austrians. They were now entering territory that had been ceded to them when the Russians, at Lenin's insistence, finally signed the Brest-Litovsk treaty on March 3rd, the very day of the German entry in Kiev. The Kievan and Kharkov based Bolsheviks, deeply unhappy with each other, gathered at Taganrog, in the Kuban.
(9) Xenia Joukoff Eudin: 'The German Occupation of the Ukraine in 1918', The Russian Review, 1941, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Nov., 1941), p.91.
The Germans didn't have a totally easy time of it. They entered with large forces and they encountered opposition. According to a 'Heeresgruppe Eichhorn report of 29 July 1918 on operations' quoted by Mędrzecki:
'The enemy we were fighting against included representatives of different groups. They were mainly Bolshevik bands and the Red Guard of the Russian government sent to Ukraine. Among them were Russian ex-service men, sailors, factory workers, the unemployed, and peasantry with no farmland of their own, who had nothing to lose and were looking forward to high pay and the right to rob. This opinion is corroborated by Austrian and German captives. As a matter of fact, we were fighting against people with no military training. They can easily operate machine guns, but cannot make use of artillery. Their main striking force are armored trains ... In general, their defensive operations were unplanned and unprepared. The Bolsheviks' munitions were perfect - they were taking advantage of Russian magazines. The number of horses - about right. The Czechs were an exacting enemy - well organized, skilled.'
Looked at from a Russian point of view this was a huge loss of Russian territory but from a Ukrainian Nationalist point of view it was the liberation of the whole area of what was later to become the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, done in alliance with the Rada as legitimate government of Ukraine. The Rada's democratic credentials may have been questionable but the parties that made it up - most notably the Ukrainian Socialist revolutionaries - had quite convincingly won in the elections for the Constitutional Assembly (terminated by the Bolsheviks on January 6/19). Pavlo Khrystiuk, who had been one of the Ukrainian negotiators in Brest-Litovsk and who was very critical of subsequent German policy in the Ukraine, described the Brest-Litovsk accord as:
'the only peace treaty not burdened with imperialistic zeal after the World War … It was peace without annexation … and enabled the principle of self-determination. Yes, Galicia was situated outside of Ukrainian boundaries, but guarantees were obtained for the national development of the Ukrainians living there. Moreover from the economic point of view, the peace treaty was advantageous. It introduced a law of reciprocity in the relations between Ukraine and the Central Powers.' (10)
(10) Quoted in Mędrzecki: Germany and Ukraine, p.65, fn 15. Lacunae as in Mędrzecki.
According to the arrangement made at Brest-Litovsk, the restored Rada was expected to supply Germany-Austria with a million tons of grain. According to Borzęcki's review of Mędrzecki's book (p.762) 'this was a moderate amount that Ukraine would normally be able to export with no difficulty.' But the situation was not normal. Both the Bolsheviks in Kharkov and the Socialist-Revolutionary dominated Rada in Kiev had a policy of dispossessing landlords and distributing the land among the peasants. Ideally this would have entailed an initial seizure of the land by the state prior to redistribution but neither the Bolsheviks nor the Rada had been in a position to do it. the peasantry were in the process of doing it for themselves. Nor was the restored Rada now in any position to establish order. They had never been regarded with any great respect and now their power was based on the bayonets of the German army that many of the peasants had only recently, as soldiers, been fighting. In a report dated 11th March 1918, members of the German delegation in Ukraine wrote (Mędrzecki, p.52):
'The people usually are not well disposed, often even hostile, specifically the peasants and workers who are afraid that the German invasion will imperil the achievements of the revolution. It is obvious that most of the peasants and workers are armed. The true authority of the Rada only goes as far as our military power . . . There certainly is excess food, but only among peasants, as the large estates were plundered, and the only chance of obtaining grain by the traders is to offer peasants goods in return.'
General Wilhelm Groener, Chief of Staff of the German Supreme Army and the dominant figure in German policy throughout the whole period of the occupation, wrote on 15th March (Mędrzecki, p.53): "The people who are at present unsuccessfully trying to rule Ukraine are like children. They believe that a government can exist without a bureaucracy. It is irritating.'
On 26th March 1918, the German Foreign Office wrote to Baron Mumm (Philip Alfons Mumm von Schwarzenstein, the German ambassador in Kiev):
'Our military intervention in the Ukraine is justified by the request of the Rada for help. We have recognized the Rada as the legal government of the Ukrainian Republic and have concluded peace with its representatives. The above facts must determine our further relations with the Ukraine if we wish to be consistent in our policy. Moreover, the main purpose of our occupation is to secure the export of grain from the Ukraine to countries of the Central Powers. Our representatives in Kiev must cooperate in every way possible to realize this aim. There must be no vacillation on our part. The government of the Rada must be continuously reminded that we are fulfilling its request and are strengthening its position, but that we demand that all measures possible be taken to secure the export of grain. We must stress the fact that the prospect of grain supplies alone can redress the balance in our peace agreement with the Ukraine. Consequently, we must insist that the Ukrainian government carry out its peace obligations … The Rada should issue an order forcing every actual possessor of land to cultivate that land fully. Such an order need not interfere with future regulations concerning the principle of land ownership.' (Eudin: German occupation, pp.93-4).
But in April the Germans took matters into their own hands. On 5th April, Field Marshall Hermann von Eichorn, appointed on March 31st as head of 'Army Group Eichorn-Kiev', issued an order that:
'The harvest shall belong to those individuals who sow the seeds... Any peasant who takes more land than he can cultivate, is doing irreparable harm to the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian people, and, therefore, must be punished. Whenever the peasants are unable to sow seed, the landlords must do this sowing if they have remained on their estates. . . Half of the harvest from such planting shall belong to those who sowed the seed, and half to the peasants. Anyone who attempts to plunder or destroy [crops] shall be severely punished.' (Eudin, p.94)
And on 25th April, without consulting the Rada, he established German Courts Martial with jurisdiction over the Ukrainians:
'Irresponsible individuals and unions are attempting to terrorize the population. In violation of good order and of every right, they are making arrests to intimidate those who, in the interests of their native land and the new government, are ready to work in cooperation with the Germans. I shall allow no lawless action where German troops are stationed. I am, therefore, establishing special courts to serve as a protection for Kiev and to bring to trial all individuals whose actions are illegal. My instructions are as follows:
'1. All persons found guilty of violating public order and all criminal offenders against German troops and their allies, or persons connected with these criminal offenders, shall be tried by German court-martial.
'2. Any violation of public order, especially as a result of street meetings, is forbidden.
'3. Any attempt against public tranquillity or safety through agitation in the press, or by any other means, is also forbidden. Newspapers guilty of such attempts shall be immediately suppressed.
'4. The existing Ukrainian courts shall continue their activity but shall not concern themselves with criminal offences which, according to Article I of this order, are now under German jurisdiction.
'This regulation shall go into effect immediately after its publication and after it is made known by posting in the streets and public places….' (Eudin, pp.94-5)
Three days later, on April 28th, 'a German lieutenant with a detachment of heavily armed soldiers' (Eudin) entered the Rada building where Eichorn's order was under discussion, put an end to the session and obliged members to surrender their weapons. Leading ministers were arrested and imprisoned. The way was open for the assumption of power the following day, 29th April, by the 'Hetman', Pavel Skoropadsky.